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We analyse the eﬀect of international economic integration on
environmental policy incentives when product markets are char-
acterised by imperfect competition and national policy makers
act strategically. If traditional trade policy instruments are not
available, environmental policies will typically be determined by
the interaction of conﬂicting policy incentives. We ﬁnd that eco-
nomic integration — interpreted as a reduction of non-tariﬀ trade
costs — will reduce policy distortions in the non-cooperative pol-
icy game if the marginal social cost of pollution is increasing at
as u ﬃciently low rate. In this case, it follows that increased in-
tegration reduces the need for transnational policy coordination,
from an environmentalist perspective.
Keywords: Economic integration; Strategic environmental pol-
icy; Policy coordination.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F12, F15, F18, H23
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the most important features of the ongoing process of glob-
alisation is the increased integration of national (or regional) product
markets. Elimination of trade barriers through bilateral or multilateral
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1free trade agreements are accompanied by reductions of non-tariﬀ trade
costs, such as improved infrastructure and reduced bureaucratic barriers
to trade. Reduction of non-tariﬀ trade costs is arguably the more impor-
tant force in the current process of international economic integration,
due to the widespread establishment of free trade areas such as the Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA), the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA). A recent example of
an institutional reform that implies non-tariﬀ trade cost reductions is
the introduction of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
The process of international economic integration has raised many
concerns among environmentalists, who argue that the consequent in-
crease in trade ﬂows will lead to increased pollution, and that increased
openness of economies will undermine the eﬀectiveness of national envi-
ronmental policies. In particular, there seems to be a widespread belief —
not only among environmentalists — that international economic integra-
tion increases the need for transnational coordination of environmental
policies. For instance, in a fairly recent WTO report on the environmen-
tal consequences of increased trade, it is argued that
“...the ongoing dismantling of economic borders reinforces
the need to cooperate on environmental matters, especially
on transboundary and global environmental problems that
are beyond the control of any individual nation.” (WTO,
1999, p.1.)
The aim of the present paper is to study precisely the relationship
between product market integration and the eﬀect of environmental pol-
icy coordination — from an environmentalist perspective — when product
markets are characterised by imperfect competition and national policy
makers act strategically.
In a world of imperfect competition, national policy makers typically
have incentives to use environmental policies strategically to pursue non-
environmental goals, for example to use emission taxes, or other envi-
ronmental policy instruments, as strategic trade policy tools. These
incentives are particularly relevant when free trade agreements have
eliminated the viability of traditional trade policy instruments such as
import tariﬀs or export subsidies. Thus, in a non-cooperative policy
game, the chosen environmental policies will typically be determined by
the interaction of conﬂicting policy incentives, so the environmental ef-
fect of policy coordination is a priori not clear. In the present paper
we analyse how diﬀerent policy incentives interact in determining the
optimal non-cooperative environmental policies, with a particular focus
on how economic integration is likely to aﬀect the environmental gain
2of transnational policy coordination. Does international economic inte-
gration increase or reduce the distortion of environmental policies in the
non-cooperative policy game?
The idea that imperfect competition in global markets creates dis-
torted incentives with respect to national environmental policy making
is not new. Early contributions to the literature on ‘strategic environ-
mental policy’ — based on the idea of strategic trade policy in Brander
and Spencer (1985) — include Conrad (1993), Barrett (1994), Kennedy
(1994), Rauscher (1994) and Ulph (1996). The main insight from this
body of literature is that national governments, when being prevented
from using export subsidies or other direct trade policy instruments,
may have incentives to adopt lax environmental standards in order to
promote the competitiveness of domestic ﬁrms, a policy that has been
termed ‘ecological dumping’.1,2 By applying a model of reciprocal trade
— rather than the third-market model of Brander and Spencer (1985)
— the present paper adds to this literature by studying how the non-
cooperative policy incentives, and the eﬃcient (second-best) policy, de-
pend on the degree of product market integration.
The two papers which relate perhaps most closely to the present
study are Kennedy (1994) and Burguet and Sempere (2003). In the for-
mer paper, a two-country model with oligopolistic competition is used
to analyse how strategic interaction between governments can lead to in-
eﬃcient distortion of pollution taxes in the non-cooperative policy equi-
librium. However, there are no costs of trade in that model, so the issue
of product market integration (or trade liberalisation) is not tackled.3
Burguet and Sempere (B&S), on the other hand, use a related type of
framework to analyse how trade liberalisation aﬀects non-cooperative
environmental policies and welfare. However, they only focus on the
non-cooperative policy game, so the question of how trade liberalisation
aﬀects the environmental gain of policy coordination is not an issue in
their paper. We show that trade liberalisation — or economic integration
—a ﬀects not only the non-cooperative policy outcome, but also the ef-
ﬁcient solution. Thus, even if increased integration leads to a more lax
environmental policy in the non-cooperative policy game, it does not
1A related body of literature focus on the interaction between trade policy and
environmental policy instrument, see, e.g., Walz and Wellisch (1997) and Tanguay
(2001).
2Incentives for ‘ecolocigal dumping’ when plant locations are endogenous are
analysed by, e.g., Markusen et al. (1993, 1995), Hoel (1997) and Ulph and Valentini
(2001). There is also a large body of literature on environmental polices and trade
in a competitive framework, see, e.g., Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995).
3In a similar type of framework, and still without any trade costs, Duval and
Hamilton (2002) study strategic environmental policy when markets are asymmetric.
3necessarily follow that the environmental gain of policy coordination in-
creases.
There are also other diﬀerences between the two above mentioned
papers and the present one. In contrast to B&S, who focus on local
pollution exclusively, we also allow for transboundary pollution, which
has important implications for policy incentives. Furthermore, whereas
B&S analyse trade liberalisation as a bilateral reduction of tariﬀs,w e
also focus on the eﬀect of non-tariﬀ trade barriers. Finally, in contrast
to both Kennedy and B&S, we allow for products to be diﬀerentiated,
which turns out to play an important role in determining the strength
of the diﬀerent policy incentives.
The basis for our analysis is an international duopoly model of recip-
rocal trade, in the tradition of Brander and Krugman (1983), where
a by-product of the production process is the emission of a pollutant.
The analysis rests on the fundamental assumption that free trade agree-
ments prohibit the use of traditional trade policy instruments, so that
the available number of policy tools is lower than the number of pol-
icy goals, implying that policy makers are operating in a second-best
world, at best. Thus, the main part of the analysis is carried out un-
der the assumption that trade costs do not comprise tariﬀsa ta l l ,s o
that the process of international economic integration is driven by re-
ductions of non-tariﬀ trade costs. Furthermore, in order to make the
model tractable and simple — while still preserving the relevant trade-oﬀs
between diﬀerent policy incentives — we assume that the only available
policy instrument is an emission tax.
In this non-competitive scenario, policy making has to balance three
diﬀerent considerations: ﬁrst, imperfect competition creates an under-
provision problem, so there is an incentive to reduce emission taxes in or-
der to improve product market eﬃciency. Second, in the non-cooperative
policy game there is an incentive to reduce taxes in order to capture
oligopoly rents from the foreign country. Third, considerations for en-
vironmental damage yield incentives to keep emission taxes high. The
strength of these partly conﬂicting policy incentives, as well as the eﬀect
of policy coordination, depend — in diﬀe r e n tw a y s—o nt h ed e g r e eo f
product market integration. Stronger integration increases competition,
implying that considerations for product market eﬃciency reduces the
downward pressure on emission taxes when national policies are coordi-
nated. The relationship between integration and the coordination eﬀect
on the two other policy incentives are, however, ambiguous. Regarding
environmental incentives, increased integration actually reduces the up-
ward pressure on emission taxes when policies are coordinated, provided
that pollution is predominantly local. In this case, non-cooperative pol-
4icy making tends to yield excessively high taxes due to incentives for
‘pollution-shifting’, and these incentives are reinforced when product
markets are integrated.
Our main result is that product market integration always reduces
the need for policy coordination — from an environmentalist perspec-
tive — if the marginal social cost of pollution is constant, or if pollution
is purely local. Given that policy coordination reduces pollution, this
means that the process of economic integration reduces the policy distor-
tions in the non-cooperative policy game and moves the non-cooperative
equilibrium closer to the eﬃcient (second-best) solution, in terms of equi-
librium emission tax levels. There are two main eﬀects that contribute
to this result. In addition to the above mentioned ‘pollution-shifting’
eﬀect, which applies when pollution is suﬃciently local in nature, eco-
nomic integration also reduces the incentive to keep emission taxes high
in the coordination regime in order to curtail the total outlay on trade
costs.
However, it turns out that results are crucially dependent on whether
the process of product market integration is driven by a reduction of tar-
iﬀ or non-tariﬀ trade costs. In the former case, which we brieﬂye x a m i n e
towards the end of the paper, economic integration always increases
the environmental gain (i.e., the reduction of total emissions) of pol-
icy coordination. If trade costs are recouped as tariﬀ revenues, trade
liberalisation implies that incentives for both product market eﬃciency
and rent-shifting contribute towards increasing the upward pressure on
emission taxes when policies are coordinated. In our model, these two
eﬀects are always dominating, even though — somewhat paradoxically —
purely environmental incentives might work in the opposite direction.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section
we present the fundamental ingredients of the model. In Section 3, the
non-cooperative equilibrium is derived, and we also consider the eﬀect of
economic integration on non-cooperative equilibrium policies. In Section
4w ea n a l y s et h ee n v i r o n m e n t a le ﬀect of a transnational coordination of
national policies, and examine under which circumstances policy coor-
dination is likely to reduce total pollution. Section 5 contains the main
contribution of the paper. Here we a n a l y s eh o we c o n o m i ci n t e g r a t i o n
aﬀects the environmental gain of transnational policy coordination. In
Section 6 we examine how the assumption of non-tariﬀ trade costs aﬀects
the results. Finally, some concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 7.
2M o d e l
Consider an international duopoly — with ﬁrm i l o c a t e di nc o u n t r yi,
i =1 ,2 —w h e r ee a c hﬁrm produces its own variant of a diﬀerentiated
5product. The preferences of a representative consumer in country i is


























j is the quantity supplied in country i by ﬁrm j,a n dy is a
numeraire good. With a ﬁxed income, utility maximisation then yields















i,j =1 ,2,i6= j, where pi
j is the price of good j (produced by ﬁrm j)i n
country i.4 The parameter b ∈ [0,1] is a measure of the degree of product
diﬀerentiation, where b =1implies that the goods are homogeneous.
The ﬁrms act as Cournot players, and we also adopt the market
segmentation hypothesis, implying that each ﬁr m sc h o o s e si t so p t i m a l
supply of the good for each market separately. There are no ﬁxed costs,
and marginal production costs are assumed to be constant and equal for
both ﬁrms. Without loss of generality, these costs are set equal to zero.
There are also some trade costs associated with exports: we assume that
each ﬁr mh a st op a yap e r - u n i tc o s tt for goods supplied to the foreign
market. This cost parameter encompasses all non-tariﬀ costs associated
with serving a foreign market, such as transportation costs, red tape
and various regulatory requirements that complicate and/or delay the
trading process.
Production of the goods causes emissions of a pollutant. Emissions






i,i , j =1 ,2, (4)
where the parameter k>0 represents the emission rate (or the abate-
ment technology). Given the technology k, no additional abatement
is possible, so emissions can only be reduced by reducing production.
We follow the speciﬁcation in Kennedy (1994) and assume that total
pollution in country i, Ωi,i sg i v e nb y
Ω
i = Ei + αEj,i , j =1 ,2,i 6= j, (5)
4Regarding notation, the following convention is adopted throughout the paper:
subscripts attached to a variable indicate the ﬁrm/product, whereas superscripts
indicate the country.
6where the parameter α ∈ (0,1) indicates the degree to which pollution
is transboundary. If α =0 , pollution is purely local, whereas α =1
implies that pollution is completely transboundary.5
Pollution causes environmental damage, and the social evaluation
of these costs is given by a damage cost function Di := D(Ωi),w h e r e
D0 (·) > 0 and D00(·) ≥ 0. Each national policy maker can inﬂuence the
total level of emissions by levying an emission tax τ on the domestic
ﬁrm. We deﬁne social welfare in country i as
W
i = U
i + πi + τiEi − D
i,i =1 ,2, (6)
where τiEi is emission tax revenue for the government in country i,a n d













i − τiEi,i , j =1 ,2,i 6= j. (7)
T h eg a m ei sp l a y e di nt w os t a g e s :
• Stage 1: the governments in the two countries decide — coopera-
tively or non-cooperatively — on the environmental policy by set-
ting emission taxes.
• Stage 2: the ﬁrms compete in Cournot fashion by choosing — non-
cooperatively — how much to supply for each market.
3 The non-cooperative equilibrium
For given national policies (τi,τj),w ec a nﬁnd the equilibrium levels





2 − b + bt + bkτj − 2τik




2 − b − 2t + bkτj − 2τik
4 − b2 , (9)
i,j =1 ,2,i6= j. We will assume throughout that the equilibrium implies
two-way trade. From (9) we see that this requires trade costs to be below
a certain prohibitive level.6
5This is not the only plausible way to model transboundary pollution. An al-
ternative speciﬁcation could be Ωi =( 1− α)Ei + αEj. T h i sw o u l d ,h o w e v e r ,n o t
change our results qualitatively.
6From (9) we see that whether or not the equilibrium is characterised by two-way
trade also depends on the level of emission taxes. These are, however, endogenously
7Anticipating the outcome of the production game, the national pol-
icy makers simultaneously and non-cooperatively set emission taxes to
maximise (domestic) social welfare. For the subsequent analysis, it will





















is the net trade surplus for country i.T h e ﬁrst-order condition for an













When setting an optimal emission tax rate, each government has to
balance three diﬀerent considerations: product market eﬃciency, net
trade surplus and environmental damage. In order better to grasp the
intuition for the main results of the model, we will proceed by taking a
more in-depth look at the decomposed eﬀects of the ﬁrst-order condition,
evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium τ1 = τ2 = τnc. We assume an
interior solution, i.e., τnc > 0.
Product market eﬃciency






2 (1 + τnck(1 + b)) + b3t
(2 − b)
2 (2 + b)
2 < 0. (13)
Thus, considerations for product market eﬃciency pull in the direction
of lower emission taxes. This is of course due to the fact that imper-
fect competition creates an under-provision problem when environmental
damages are not taken into account.7
determined in the model. Under the basic assumption that taxes are never set so
high that ﬁrms do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to operate even in their home markets,
the assumption of two-way trade boils down to the assumption that trade costs are
suﬃciently low. For zero emission taxes, two-way trade prevails if t<1 − b
2.F o r
a related discussion in a similiar type of model, see also Naylor (1998, 1999), where
production costs of ﬁrms are determined by monopoly trade unions.
7As observed by Barnett (1980), imperfectly competitive and polluting ﬁrms may
under-produce from a social perspective if the market power eﬀect outweighs the
environmental damages.
8Net trade surplus




(2 − b)(b +2 τnck) − tb2
(2 − b)
2 (2 + b)
< 0. (14)
By increasing taxes for the domestic ﬁrm, rents are shifted to the foreign
country. Thus, considerations for the net trade surplus — the strategic
trade policy incentives — also pull in the direction of a more lax environ-
mental policy.
Environmental damage
Once more, by inserting the equilibrium expression from the produc-






2k2 (2 − αb)
4 − b2 > 0. (15)
This illustrates the environmental gains from emission taxation. In-
creased taxation reduces production and thus pollution. Note that a
lower value of α yields incentives for a tougher environmental policy
(i.e., higher emission taxes). If pollution is predominantly local, uncoor-
dinated taxation implies that each government has an incentive to use
the tax instrument to shift (polluting) production to the other country.8
Using (13)-(15), the equilibrium non-cooperative emission tax rate is
then characterised by the following equation:
−
[4 + b2 (1 − b − 2t)+τnck(2 − b)(6+3b − b2)]
(2 − b)








Before analysing the eﬀects of policy coordination, let us see how eco-
nomic integration — interpreted as a (marginal) reduction of trade costs
—a ﬀects the uncoordinated policy equilibrium. Once more, it is useful









which implies that economic integration reduces the negative eﬀect of
increased taxation on consumer utility. This is due to the fact that
8This ‘pollution shifting’ eﬀect was identiﬁed by Kennedy (1994).
9economic integration increases the degree of competition, and thus total
output, which alleviates the under-provision problem. Ceteris paribus,
a reduction of trade costs leads then to a tougher environmental policy.








which implies that economic integration increases incentives for rent-
shifting activity by the governments. The reason is simply that lower
trade costs make it easier to capture rents from the foreign market.
Ceteris paribus, this means that trade cost reductions encourage a more
lax environmental policy.










2k3 (1 + α)(2− αb)
(2 + b)(4− b2)
≤ 0. (19)
Lower trade costs increase total production and thus pollution. This is
the so-called ‘scale eﬀect’ of product market integration. If the dam-
age cost function is strictly convex, this means that the social beneﬁto f
reducing pollution increases as a result of reduced trade costs. Thus, en-
vironmental considerations call for a tougher environmental policy when
product markets become more integrated, as long as the marginal social
cost of pollution is increasing.









− D00 (·)k2 (1 + α)(2− bα)
´
k(6 + 3b − b2 +4 k2D00 (·)(1+α)(2− bα))
. (20)
The following result follows immediately:
Proposition 1 I nt h en o n - c o o p e r a t i v ee q u i l i b r i u m ,e c o n o m i ci n t e g r a -
tion always leads to a more lax environmental policy if the marginal
social cost of pollution is constant. With a strictly convex damage cost
function, economic integration leads to a tougher environmental policy
if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, or if the emission rate (k)i s
suﬃciently high.
I ft h ed a m a g ec o s tf u n c t i o ni sl i n e a r ,t r a d ec o s tr e d u c t i o nd o e sn o ti n -
ﬂuence how environmental considerations aﬀect the optimal policy; only
incentives for rent-shifting and for improving product market eﬃciency
are aﬀected. It turns out that the rent-shifting eﬀect dominates, im-
plying that economic integration leads to lower emission taxes, because
10incentives for rent-shifting are suﬃciently strengthened. The strength
of both eﬀects are, however, determined by the degree of product diﬀer-
entiation. For instance, the higher the degree of product diﬀerentiation
the more diﬃcult it is to capture rents from the foreign country by low-
ering emission taxes. Thus, with increasing marginal costs of pollution,
environmental considerations will dominate if products are suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated, implying that product market integration leads to higher
taxes.
4 Transnational policy coordination
In the coordinated policy regime, the two governments (or a transna-
tional governmental body) optimally set emission taxes to maximise joint






















Performing our usual decomposition of policy incentives, and evaluating
at the symmetric cooperative equilibrium τ1 = τ2 = τc,w ec a nn o w
derive
∂ [Ui (τc)+Uj (τc)]
∂τi
= −k
2+( 1+b)(t +2 τck)
(b +2 )
2 < 0, (22)










2k2 (1 + α)
2+b
> 0. (24)
Comparing with the non-cooperative solution, there are two important
aspects to note. First, incentives for rent-shifting are now eliminated.
Instead, the countries have a common incentive to increase taxes in order
to reduce costly trade, as illustrated by (23). Second, the marginal
environmental beneﬁt of emission taxation is now increasing in α,s i n c e
‘pollution shifting’ incentives are eliminated by policy coordination.
Using (22)-(24), the optimal emission tax rate in the coordinated
equilibrium is given by the solution to
−







In the following subsection we present a more detailed comparison of the
two policy regimes.
114.1 When does transnational policy coordination
reduce environmental pollution?
In order to analyse how policy coordination aﬀects equilibrium emis-
sion taxes, we once more start out by investigating the decomposed
eﬀects. We do so by by evaluating the changes in policy incentives at





∂τi , which reduces
to
∂Wj(τnc)
∂τi . It follows that policy coordination leads to a tougher en-














2 (1 + τnck(1 + b)) + t(4 − 3b2)
(2 − b)
2 (2 + b)
2 < 0, (26)
which implies that coordination yields incentives for lower taxes. In
the non-coordination regime, each policy maker does not care about the
share of domestic production that is consumed by foreigners, so the full
extent of the under-provision problem is not taken into account. When
national policies are coordinated, though, this eﬀect is internalised.





(2 − b)(b +2 kτnc)+4 t(1 − b)
(2 − b)
2 (2 + b)
> 0. (27)
From a comparison of (14) and (23), this eﬀect is obvious. By eliminat-
ing rent-shifting incentives, policy coordination yields — all else equal —
incentives for a tougher environmental policy.
Finally, the change in policy incentives that is related to environmen-

























In words, policy coordination always increases the marginal environ-
mental beneﬁt of emission taxes — implying, all else equal, that taxes
12are increased — if α > 1
2 or if products are unrelated (b =0 ), whereas
the opposite is true if pollution is purely local (α =0 ). When pollution
is highly transboundary, non-coordinated policies imply too low taxes
— from an environmental perspective — because the negative externality
on the other country’s environment is not taken into account. However,
when pollution is predominantly local, non-coordinated policies imply
excessively high taxes — still from an environmental perspective — be-
cause each local policy maker is trying to shift polluting production to
the other country. This last eﬀect is more pronounced the less diﬀeren-
tiated the products are.
Based on the above discussion, we can already conclude that the
more transboundary pollution is, the more likely it is that transnational
policy coordination beneﬁts the environment. For the special case of
homogeneous products, we are also able to derive the following result:
Proposition 2 I nt h ec a s eo fh o m o g e n e o u sg o o d s ,as u ﬃcient condition
for transnational policy coordination to reduce environmental pollution
is α > 1
2.















9k(2 + 4kτnc − t) > 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
from (28) we know that, in this case, −
∂Dj(τnc)
∂τi > 0 if α > 1
2.
This result is explained by two diﬀerent eﬀects. First, we know that
rent-shifting incentives in the non-cooperative regime are stronger the
less diﬀerentiated the products are. Thus, in the case of homogeneous
goods, the elimination of rent-shifting incentives dominates the increased
incentives for alleviating the under-provision problem when national
policies are coordinated. If, in addition, pollution is transboundary to
as u ﬃcient degree, environmental considerations also imply that pol-
icy coordination leads to higher taxes. On the other hand, if products
are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, or if pollution is predominantly local, the
environmental eﬀect of policy coordination is generally ambiguous.9
9In a setting of imperfect competition and strategic environmental policy, Greaker
(2003) also observes the possibility that policy coordination could lead to lower emis-
sion taxes, but for diﬀerent reasons. In his model, the possibility that higher emission
taxes could reduce the marginal cost of production (emissions as an ‘inferior input’
to production) implies that taxes will be set excessively high in the non-cooperative
equilibrium.
135 Does economic integration increase the environ-
mental gain from policy coordination?
The degree of product market integration — interpreted as the level of
trade costs — is inﬂuential in determining the eﬀect of policy coordina-
tion. Our focus is on whether or not the process of economic integration
increases the need for policy coordination, as viewed from an environ-
mental perspective. In other words: assuming that policy coordination
yields a tougher environmental policy, will product market integration
move the non-cooperative emission tax level further away from the eﬃ-
cient (second-best) level?
Since the marginal eﬀect of taxation on total emissions is independent
of trade costs, it follows from our previous analysis that integration







< 0. Again, we proceed by considering the
decomposed eﬀects.












2 (b +2 )
2 . (29)
By inserting the expression for ∂τnc









12 − 9b2 + b3 +2 D00 (·)k2 (1 + α)(2+b)(1− b)(2− bα)




∂τi < 0, it follows from (30) that product market integration
reduces the coordination eﬀect on eﬃciency incentives. This result is
explained simply by the fact that lower trade costs leads to increased
competition. The subsequent decrease in consumer prices reduces the
ineﬃciency caused by imperfect competition in the ﬁrst place. Ceteris
paribus, this means that integration increases the probability that policy
coordination results in higher emission taxes.
The relationship between trade costs and the coordination eﬀect on








2(1− b)+k(2 − b) ∂τnc
∂t
(2 − b)
2 (2 + b)
, (31)
14from which, when inserting for ∂τnc









4k(6 − 3b − 3b2 + b3 + D00(·)k2 (1 + α)(2− 3b)(2− bα))
(2 + b)(6+3b − b2 +4 D00(·)k2 (1 + α)(2− bα))(2 − b)
2 .
A closer inspection of (32) shows that suﬃcient conditions for economic







> 0,a r eb<2
3 or D00(·)=0 . However, with strictly
convex damage costs and a suﬃciently low degree of product diﬀerentia-
tion, the opposite result might hold true. The intuition is somewhat in-
tricate, but still tractable. For a given level of emission taxes, integration
implies that incentives for rent-shifting activity in the non-cooperative
regime are increased — cf. (18). However, lower trade costs also reduce
incentives for using environmental policy to reduce the amount of two-
way trade in the coordination regime — cf. (23). For b<1, it turns
out that the second eﬀect dominates, implying that product market in-
tegration reduces the coordination eﬀect on rent-shifting incentives, and
more so the higher the degree of product diﬀerentiation, because rent-
shifting incentives are then less sensitive to the level of trade costs in the
non-cooperative regime. These are the direct eﬀects. However, we are
evaluating the coordination eﬀects at the non-coordinated equilibrium,
so a reduction of trade costs also implies that τnc changes. If ∂τnc
∂t is
positive, product market integration means that τnc goes down, which
reduces the incentives for rent-shifting in the non-coordinated regime.
This reinforces the result that economic integration reduces the coordi-







> 0,e ﬃciency and rent-shifting incentives work in
opposite directions with respect to the environmental gain of policy co-
ordination when product markets become more integrated. Concerns
for product market eﬃciency put a downward pressure on environmental
taxes when national policies are coordinated, but this pressure is reduced
when trade costs are lowered. Conversely, the elimination of rent-shifting
incentives through policy coordination puts an upward pressure on emis-
sion taxes, but this eﬀect is also reduced by economic integration. In
this case, the sum of these two eﬀects are generally ambiguous.
Finally, then, let us see how the degree of product market integration
determines the coordination eﬀect on environmental incentives. From







































2k3D00 (·)(b − 2α)
£
Φ +4 D00 (·)k2 (1 + α)(2− b)(2− bα)
2¤
(2 − b)
3 (2 + b)
2 [6 + 3b − b2 +4 k2D00(·)(1+α)(2− bα)]
,
where
Φ := 12(1 + α)(2− b) − b
2 ¡
10 − 3b + b











=0if the marginal social cost
of pollution is constant. Since the marginal eﬀe c to ft a x a t i o no nt o t a l
pollution is independent of trade costs, product market integration does
not inﬂuence the coordination eﬀect on environmental incentives if mar-
ginal damage costs are independent of the level of pollution. For strictly







> 0 if α < b
2.
In this case — when pollution is predominantly local — environmental
incentives put a downward pressure on emission taxes when national
policies are coordinated, due to the elimination of ‘pollution-shifting’
incentives.10 A reduction of trade costs implies that total production
increases, with an equivalent increase in total emissions. Due to convex-
ity of the damage cost function, higher emissions increase the incentives
to shift polluting production to the other country by setting high taxes
in the non-coordinated regime. Consequently, lower trade costs imply
that the coordination eﬀect increases. All else equal, product market
integration then increases the probability — due to purely environmental
considerations — that coordination leads to lower emission taxes! The
‘inverse intuition’ applies when α > b
2.
In order to derive somewhat more clear-cut answers to the ques-
tion we pose in this section of the paper, we now proceed by consid-
ering a more speciﬁc environmental damage cost function, given by
Di = d
2 (Ωi)
2, d>0. With this quadratic cost function, we can de-
rive explicit solutions for equilibrium emission taxes in the two diﬀerent
policy regimes. These are given by
τnc =
2dk2 (1 + α)(2− b)(2− αb)(2− t) − 4 − b2 (1 − b − 2t)
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¡
1+b +2 d(1 + α)
2 k2¢ . (36)
The relationship between the degree of product market integration
and the environmental eﬀect of transnational policy coordination can
now be summarised as follows
Proposition 3 (i) With a constant marginal social cost of pollution,
product market integration reduces the environmental gain of policy co-
ordination if products are diﬀerentiated. (ii) With a quadratic damage
cost function, product market integration reduces the environmental gain
from policy coordination if
1. Pollution is purely local (α =0 ) and products are diﬀerentiated, or
2. α < 1/3 and products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.









(2−b)(6+3b−b2) > 0 iﬀ b<1.
(ii) Using (35) and (36) we ﬁnd that
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∂t > 0 if b<b :=
3+2dk2(1+α)(1−3α)
3+2dk2(1+α)(1−α) . It is easily
veriﬁed that b =1if α =0and b ∈ (0,1) for α ∈ (0,1/3).
From an environmental perspective, it appears that the process of
increased product market integration between countries does not nec-
essarily imply an increased need for transnational policy coordination.
This is actually never the case when the social marginal cost of pollution
is constant, so that the ‘scale eﬀect’ of increased integration does not af-
fect the marginal incentives for reducing pollution.11 B u te v e nw i t ha
strictly convex damage cost function, increased integration reduces the
environmental gain from policy coordination if products are suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated and pollution is predominantly local in nature.
As the above analysis indicates, two diﬀerent eﬀects contribute to this
result. First, lower trade costs reduce the incentives to keep taxes high
11Furthermore, since
∂Ωi(τnc)
∂t < 0 (due to the ‘scale eﬀect’ of integration) it follows
that product market integration reduces the relative environmental gain from policy
coordination even more.
17in the coordination regime in order to reduce total outlay on trade costs.
Secondly, and perhaps most noteworthy, product market integration
increases the incentives for ‘pollution-shifting’ in the non-coordinated
regime if α is suﬃciently low, and these incentives are eliminated through
policy coordination. Thus, if pollution is predominantly local, product
market integration could lower the environmental gain from policy co-
ordination due to purely environmental considerations.
6T a r i ﬀs
We have conducted our analysis under the assumption that product
market integration implies a reduction of non-tariﬀ trade costs, which is
arguably the most important aspect of economic integration for many in-
dustries, at least within free-trade areas such as the EEA. In this section,
though, we also want to look brieﬂy into the situation where trade costs
also comprise tariﬀs. We now make the exaggerated assumption that the
cost of trade is solely due to tariﬀs, which are equal for both countries
(and given by t). Product market integration (or trade liberalisation) is
taken to mean a bilateral reduction of tariﬀs.
The assumption of trade-costs-as-tariﬀs changes the analysis through




















the important implication being that Si + Sj =0 . When policies are
coordinated, there are no longer any incentives to reduce total trade
volumes because all trade costs are recouped as tariﬀ revenues. This
has, of course, implications for the eﬀect of policy coordination on rent-
shifting incentives. Regarding the impact of trade liberalisation on the
environmental eﬀect of coordination, the important diﬀerence from the
analysis in Section 5 is that eﬃciency and rent-shifting incentives now
work in the same direction. From the ﬁrst-order condition of the non-








b +2 D00 (·)k2 (2 − αb)(1+α)
(6 + 3b − b2 +4 D00 (·)k2 (2 − αb)(1+α))(2 − b)
2 < 0
(38)
This is highly intuitive. Trade liberalisation increases incentives for rent-
shifting in the non-cooperative policy regime, which implies that policy
coordination then causes — all else equal — a stronger upward pressure
on taxes. At the same time, tariﬀ reductions also reduce the product
12To save space, the details of the derivations are not explicitly shown, but the
procedure is completely equivalent to the previous analysis, with the re-speciﬁcation
of Si.
18market ineﬃciency caused by imperfect competition, which implies that
policy coordination causes — all else equal — a lower downward pressure
on taxes. Consequently, both eﬃciency and rent-shifting incentives pull
in the direction of increasing the environmental gain of coordination
when tariﬀs are reduced. The overall eﬀect of tariﬀ reductions depends
thus on the strength of environmental incentives.
If the social cost of pollution is constant, it follows immediately that
tariﬀ reductions will increase the environmental gain of policy coordi-
nation. With strictly convex damage costs, a general characterisation is
hard to obtain, so, once more, we consider the special case of a quadratic
damage cost function. In this case it is straightforward to calculate





2k(2 − b)(6+3b − b2 +4 k2d(1 + α)(2− bα))
< 0.
(39)
Thus, with quadratic damage costs, a tariﬀ reduction always increase
the environmental beneﬁt of policy coordination. In other words, if the
non-cooperative equilibrium tax rate is below the eﬃcient (second-best)
level, trade liberalisation will move the non-cooperative equilibrium out-
come further away from the eﬃcient policy. Note that if pollution is pre-
dominantly local, so that incentives for pollution-shifting are high in the
non-cooperative policy game, trade liberalisation increases the environ-
mental gain of policy coordination not because of environmental incen-
tives, but because the other policy incentives (rent-shifting and product
market eﬃciency) increase the upward pressure on emission taxes when
national policies are coordinated.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
It is often claimed that the process of international economic integration
contributes towards undermining national environmental policy making
and increasing incentives for ‘eco-dumping’. The obvious response is to
call for environmental policies to be transnationally coordinated. In this
paper we have studied how the degree of economic integration aﬀects
the environmental gain of policy coordination in a context of imperfect
competition and reciprocal trade. The analysis rests on the key assump-
tion that — due to free trade agreements — there are more policy goals
than instruments. To make things fairly simple, we have focused on
an emission tax as the only available policy instruments. However, the
important underlying assumptions are that traditional trade policy in-
struments are prohibited, and that polices aimed at reducing pollution
increases the marginal production costs of ﬁrms.
Due to the often complex interaction of diﬀerent policy incentives,
19there is no clear-cut relationship between the degree of product market
integration and the need for environmental policy coordination. In fact,
we ﬁnd that — in many cases — economic integration will actually re-
duce the environmental gain of policy coordination. This could be the
case even if pollution is completely transboundary, provided that the
marginal social cost of pollution is increasing at a suﬃciently low rate.
However, the results are crucially dependent on the assumption that in-
creased economic integration is caused by reductions of non-tariﬀ trade
costs.
Even in a fairly stylised modelling set-up there is a lot of strate-
gic interaction, but, obviously, our model is only able to capture a few
o ft h en u m e r o u sf a c t o r st h a tm i g h tb er e l e v a n ti ne x p l a i n i n gt h ee f -
fect of economic integration on environmental policy incentives. For
example, we have conducted our analysis under the assumptions that
both the locations of ﬁrms (plants), as well as their technologies, are
given exogenously. Although outside the scope of the present study, a
more comprehensive analysis of the environmental policy implications
of increased economic integration should also take these dimensions into
account. This is left for further work.
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